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We find that one-quarter of the world’s consumption poor live in urban areas and that the 
proportion has been rising over time. By fostering economic growth, urbanization helped reduce 
absolute poverty in the aggregate but did little for urban poverty. Over 1993-2002, the count o 
the “$1 a day” poor fell by 150 million in rural areas but rose by 50 million in urban areas. The 
poor have been urbanizing even more rapidly than the population as a whole. There are marked 
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least; there has been a “ruralization” of poverty in Eastern Europe and Central Asia; in marked 
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urban population growth imply that a majority of the world’s poor will still live in rural areas 
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The urbanization of the developing world’s population has been viewed in different ways 
by different observers.  To some it has been seen as a positive force in economic development, as 
economic activity shifts out of agriculture to more remunerative activities.  Indeed, longstanding 
theories of economic development, going back to Arthur Lewis and Simon Kuznets, have viewed 
population urbanization as a core part of the process leading to economic growth and 
distributional change (including poverty reduction) in poor countries.  By this view, new 
economic opportunities in urban areas attract rural workers, who gain directly, and there may 
also be positive feedback effects in rural areas.  To others, urbanization has been viewed in a 
somewhat less positive light — a largely unwelcome forbearer of new poverty problems.  
Advocates of this view often point to (claimed) negative externalities of geographically 
concentrated poverty and irreversibilities due to various costs of migration, which can mean that 
migrants to urban areas cannot easily return to their old standard of living in rural areas.   
Empirical knowledge for informing this debate has been rather limited and problematic.  
We do not even have a firm grip of the basic stylized facts, including the extent to which 
absolute poverty in the world is urban versus rural.  While the premise of much development 
policy making is that extreme poverty in the developing world is primarily rural, there is a 
perception in some quarters that this has changed appreciably in recent rimes; indeed, some 
observers believe that poverty is now mainly an urban problem.  In an early expression of this 
view, the distinguished scientific journalist and publisher Gerard Piel told an international 
conference in 1996 that “The world’s poor once huddled largely in rural areas. In the modern 
world they have gravitated to the cities.” (Piel, 1997, p.58).   
This paper aims to throw new light on the extent to which poverty is in fact urbanizing in 
the developing world and what role, if any, population urbanization has played in poverty 
reduction.  We report our results in studying a new data set created for this paper, covering about 
90 developing countries with observations over time for about 80% of them.     3
The motivation for this study, and the steps in our analysis, can be grouped around five 
claims.  Let us begin with two widely-heard claims: 
Claim 1: The majority of the developing world’s population lives in rural areas, but the 
urban population share is rising and will soon exceed the rural share.  
Claim 2: The incidence of absolute poverty is higher in rural areas of developing 
countries.   
Support for Claim 1 has mainly come from the useful compilations of demographic data and 
population forecasts done by the UN Secretariat’s Population Division, in its regular report, 
World Urbanization Prospects (WUP).  The “urban” versus “rural” split of the population is 
largely based on national statistical sources. In the latter, an “urban area” is typically (though not 
universally) defined by a non-agricultural production base and a minimum population size. 
However, there are many differences between countries in the definitions used in practice; for 
example, the minimum population size can vary from two to five thousand. Some of the 
measured growth in the urban population stems from changes in the definition of an “urban 
area;” Goldstein (1990) describes how this happened in China during the 1980s.  The distinction 
between “urban” and “rural” areas is also becoming blurred; urban areas are heterogeneous, with 
a gradation from “mega-cities” to towns.  While very few people (ourselves included) question 
the validity of Claim 1, there is in fact a cloud of doubt about definitions and magnitudes.
1   
The foundations for Claim 2 are no more secure.  Almost all of our prevailing knowledge 
concerning the urban-rural poverty profile has come from country-specific poverty studies, using 
local poverty lines and measures.  The World Bank’s country-specific Poverty Assessments are 
examples of this type of evidence; compilations of the national (urban and rural) poverty 
measures can be found in the Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI; this is an annual 
publication; the latest issue is World Bank, 2006).  Drawing on evidence from this type of data, 
Ravallion (2002) estimates that 68% of the developing world’s poor live in rural areas.   
                                                 
1   The Panel on Urban Population Dynamics (2003) makes recommendations on how to address the 
problem of differening definitions of “urban”, but the implementation of their recommendations is not 
feasible with the survey data used for poverty measurement currently available in most countries.   4
Just as there are comparability problems in the population data, so too for the 
compilations of national poverty statistics.  On top of the aforementioned inconsistencies in how 
“urban areas” are defined, there is the problem that different countries naturally have different 
definitions of what “poverty” means; for example, higher real poverty lines tend to prevail in 
richer countries, which tend also to be more urbanized.  And the urban composition of the poor 
probably varies with the level of economic development and urbanization. The picture one gets 
may well be affected by such comparability problems, although (as we will explain later) there 
are theoretical ambiguities about the direction of bias in estimates of the urbanization of poverty.     
We address some of the weaknesses in existing knowledge relevant to Claim 2, but we 
have no choice but to take as given the empirical foundations of Claim 1 — based on existing 
national-level definitions of “urban” and “rural.”  By estimating everything from the primary 
data (either directly from the unit-record data when available or from specially-designed 
tabulations from those data) we are able to assure a relatively high degree of internal consistency 
in quantifying the urban-rural poverty profile.  We introduce a change in the methodology of the 
World Bank’s global poverty counts using international poverty lines, which have not previously 
been split by urban and rural areas.
2  We combine country-specific estimates of the differential in 
urban-rural poverty lines with existing Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates and survey-based 
distributions.
3  Thus we make the first decomposition of the international “$1 a day” poverty 
counts by urban and rural areas.  We re-affirm Claim 2 from these new data.  However, we also 
point to a number of continuing concerns about the available data.  
What does Claim 1 imply for the future validity of Claim 2?  Does population 
urbanization mean that the urban poverty problem will soon overtake the rural problem?  We use 
our new estimates to assess the validity of three further claims: 
                                                 
2   The only previous estimate of the urban-rural split of poverty that we know of by Ravallion 
(2002) was essentially based on the poverty measures from the WDI, using country-specific poverty lines 
rather than an international line, such as the $1 a day standard. 
3   PPP exchange rates correct for the fact that non-traded goods tend to be cheaper in poorer 
countries (where wages are lower). We use the World Bank’s PPPs.     5
Claim 3:  The urban sector’s share of the poor is rising over time. 
 Claim  4: The poor are urbanizing faster than the population as a whole.   
 Claim  5:  Population urbanization is a positive factor in overall poverty reduction. 
Past support for Claims 3 and 4 has largely come from cross-country comparisons (from similar 
data sources to those supporting Claim 2), which suggest that the urban share of the poor tends to 
be higher in more urbanized countries and that the urban poverty rate tends to be higher relative 
to the overall rate, consistent with Claim 4 (Ravallion, 2002).  Here too there are concerns about 
the empirical foundations of existing knowledge.  There is no obvious reason why the 
comparability problems noted above with reference to Claims 1 and 2 would be time invariant, 
so biases in the measured pace of the urbanization of poverty cannot be ruled out.  And the fact 
that the existing evidence for Claims 3 and 4, which are about dynamics, has largely come from 
cross-sectional data leaves room for doubt; possibly the pace of poverty’s urbanization over time 
at country level will look very different to the cross-country differences observed at one date. 
What will happen to aggregate poverty with urbanization?  If nothing happens to the 
distribution of income within either urban or rural areas then Claim 2 implies that the overall 
poverty rate (urban + rural) will fall as the urban population share rises, consistent with Claim 5.
4  
This can be termed a “Kuznets process” of urbanization, whereby a representative slice of the 
rural distribution is transformed into a representative slice of the urban distribution.
5  Given that 
the urban distribution has lower poverty, aggregate poverty must fall.  If the urban sector also has 
higher inequality than the rural sector (as is typically the case in developing countries) then 
aggregate inequality will rise in the early stages of urbanization, but eventually fall.  This is the 
famous Kuznets Hypothesis, first formulated by Kuznets (1955).   The reality may well be more 
complex, with distributional changes within each sector and interlinkages; for example, even if 
urbanization puts upward pressure on urban poverty, there can be offsetting gains to the rural 
                                                 
4   This will hold for a broad class of population-weighted decomposable poverty measures; 
Atkinson (1987) reviews this class of measures. 
5   For a thorough analysis of the distributional implications of urbanization under the Kuznets 
process see Anand and Kanbur (1993).   6
economy, such as through rural labor-market tightening and remittances back to rural residents 
stemming from migration to urban areas.   
Claim 4 is interpretable as the outcome of what can be termed a “mixed Kuznets 
process.” Intuitively, urbanization entails gains to the poor (both directly as migrants and 
indirectly via remittances), but the gains are not large enough for all previously poor new urban 
residents to escape poverty.  Thus the migration process puts a brake on the decline in urban 
poverty incidence, even when rural poverty and total poverty are falling.  To give a sharp 
characterization of this effect, suppose that a proportion δ  of the population shifts from rural to 
urban areas, of which a proportion α  attains the pre-existing urban distribution of income (the 
successful migrants) while  α − 1  keeps the rural distribution.  (Only when  1 = α  do we have the 
pure Kuznets process.)  The initial difference in poverty rates between rural and urban areas is 
0 > −
u r H H  where 
k H  is the headcount index in sector k=u,r.
 6   It is plain that this 
urbanization process will reduce aggregate poverty — the national headcount index falls by 
) (
u r H H − αδ  — but it will increase the poverty rate in urban areas, which rises by 
) /( ) ( ) 1 ( δ δ α + − −
u u r S H H , where 
u S  is the initial urban population share.   
The following section describes our methods and data.  Section 3 assesses 
whether our estimates of urban and rural poverty measures for the developing world are 
consistent with Claims 2-4 while section 4 does the same for Claim 5.  Section 5 looks at 
implications for the future urbanization of poverty and section 6 concludes.   
 
2.  Measuring urban and rural poverty in the developing world 
We focus on poverty defined in terms of household consumption per capita.  Following 
standard practices, the measures of household consumption (or income, when consumption is 
unavailable) in the survey data we use are reasonably comprehensive, including both cash 
spending and imputed values for consumption from own production.  But we acknowledge that 
                                                 
6   The headcount index is the proportion of the population living in households with consumption 
per person below the poverty line.   7
even the best consumption data need not adequately reflect certain “non-market” dimensions of 
welfare that differ between urban and rural areas, such as access to public services (invariably 
better in urban areas) and exposure to crime (typically more of a problem in urban areas). 
We make two key assumptions about poverty measurement.  Firstly, we confine attention 
to standard additively separable poverty measures for which the aggregate measure is the 
(population-weighted) sum of individual measures.  This includes the two measures reported in 
this paper, the headcount index and the poverty gap index.
7   
Secondly, we also take it as axiomatic that simply moving individuals between urban and 
rural areas (or countries), with no absolute loss in their real consumption, cannot increase the 
aggregate measure of poverty.  Relocation on its own cannot change aggregate poverty.   
These assumptions justify confining our attention to absolute poverty measures, by which 
we mean the poverty line is intended to have a constant real value both between countries and 
between urban and rural areas within countries.
8  A key issue is then how to deal with the fact 
that the cost-of-living (COL) is generally higher in urban areas.  Casual observations suggest that 
relatively weak internal market integration and the existence of geographically non-traded goods 
can yield substantial cost-of-living differences between urban and rural areas.  Any assessment 
of the urbanization of poverty that ignored these COL differences would simply not be credible.  
Yet existing Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates used to convert the international line 
into local currencies do not distinguish rural from urban areas.   
To address this problem we turn to the World Bank’s country-specific Poverty 
Assessments (PA’s), which have now been done for most developing countries.  These are core 
reports within the Bank’s program of analytic work at country level; each report describes the 
                                                 
7   The poverty gap index is the mean distance below the poverty line as a proportion of the line 
(where the mean is taken over the whole population, counting the non-poor as having zero poverty gaps.) 
On the larger set of additively separable measures see Atkinson (1987). 
8   This does not allow the possibility that a new migrant to urban areas experiences relative 
deprivation.  One can question how relevant this is for very poor people (Ravallion and Loskshin, 2005).    8
extent of poverty and its causes in that country.
9 The PA’s are clearly the best available source of 
information on urban-rural differentials for setting international poverty lines, although they have 
not previously been used for this purpose. 
The essential idea of this paper is to use country-specific urban and rural poverty lines 
from the PA’s in setting the urban-rural differential in the international poverty lines.  The fact 
that PA’s have now been completed for most developing countries makes this feasible.  Besides 
the change in methodology, our methods closely follow those outlined in Chen and Ravallion 
(2004), which provides the latest available update of the World Bank’s global poverty measures 
for $1 and $2 a day.  We follow the long-standing tradition in poverty measurement at the World 
Bank and elsewhere of relying on primary survey data to the maximum extent feasible.   
An alternative approach to global poverty measurement is to combine pre-existing 
inequality measures at country level from survey data with the estimates of mean consumption or 
income from the national accounts (NAS).
10  This is not a defensible option for doing an urban-
rural split of global poverty measures, allowing for COL differences, since neither the inequality 
measures nor the NAS means would then be valid.  This method is also questionable in the 
limiting case when the COL difference is zero.  On the one hand, it is not clear that the NAS data 
can provide a more accurate measure of mean household welfare than the survey data that were 
collected precisely for that purpose.  On the other hand, even acknowledging the problems of 
income underreporting and selective survey compliance, there can be no presumption that the 
discrepancies between survey means and the NAS aggregates (such as private consumption per 
                                                 
9   To given an indication of the scale of a PA, the average cost is about $250,000. Most, but not all, 
PA’s are public documents.   
10   Examples are Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002),  Bhalla (2002), Sala-i-Martin (2006) and 
Ackland, Dowrick and Freyens (2006). Note that the internal consistency of the compilations of existing 
inequality measures is also questionable; the measures differ in terms of the recipient unit (household 
versus individual) and the ranking variable (household versus per capita).  Only by re-estimating 
consistently from the micro data (as we have done) is it possible to address these consistency problems.   9
person) are distribution neutral; more plausibly the main reasons why surveys underestimate 
consumption or income would also lead to an underestimation of inequality.
11   
In almost all cases, the PA poverty lines were constructed using some version of the 
Cost-of-Basic-Needs method.
12   This aims to approximate a COL index that reflects the 
differences in prices faced between urban and rural areas, weighted by the consumption patterns 
of people living in a neighborhood of the country-specific poverty line.  This is consistent with 
the use of an absolute poverty standard across countries.   
While our method appears to be the best option that is currently feasible, internal 
consistency is questionable if the urban-rural COL differential varies by income.  This may stem 
from differences in the prices faced between the poor and others, or differences in consumption 
patterns.  Then the differential from the PA may not be right for the international poverty lines.  
If the COL differential tends to rise with income then we will tend to overestimate urban poverty 
by the $1 a day line in middle-income countries relative to low-income countries, given that the 
PA poverty line will tend to be above the international line for most middle-income countries.  
To help assess robustness, we also estimate poverty measures for a “$2 a day” line that is more 
typical of the poverty lines used in middle-income countries. 
A data constraint that can also create internal inconsistencies is that in setting poverty 
lines, location-specific prices are typically only available for food goods.  Also, while nutritional 
requirements for good health provide a defensible anchor in setting a reference food bundle, it is 
less obvious in practice what normative criteria should be applied in defining “non-food basic 
needs.”  The problem is compounded by the fact that poor rural infrastructure (such as 
                                                 
11   For example, Banerjee and Piketty (2005) attribute up to 40 percent of the difference between the 
(higher) growth of GDP per capita and (lower) growth of mean household per capita consumption from 
household surveys in India to unreported increase in the incomes of the rich. Selective compliance with 
random samples could well be an equally important source of bias, although the sign is theoretically 
ambiguous; Korinek et al. (2006) provide evidence on the impact of selective non-response for the US. 
On the problems of selective non-response in surveys more generally see Groves and Couper (1998).  
12   The precise method used varies from country-to-country, depending on the data available.  On the 
methods sued in setting poverty lines see Ravallion (1994, 1998).   10
incomplete electrification) means that some non-food goods found in urban areas will not be 
consumed in rural areas.  
In addressing these concerns in applied poverty measurement (including the Bank’s PAs), 
the non-food component of the poverty line is typically set according to food demand behavior in 
each sub-group of the population for which a poverty line is to be determined.  Different 
methods are found in practice, but they share the common feature that the non-food component 
of the poverty line is found by looking at the non-food spending of people in a neighborhood of 
the food poverty line, which is the cost for that sub-group of a reference food bundle (which may 
itself vary according to differences in relative prices or other factors).  Thus spending on non-
food items such as clothing and housing is included consistently with the food poverty line.  This 
typically entails a larger (sometimes appreciably larger) allowance for non-food spending in 
urban areas.  
While this approach appears to be a reasonable and operational approach to the problem 
of setting a non-food poverty line, it may well introduce some degree of relativism into the 
poverty measures, depending on the properties of the food Engel curves, which may shift with 
factors that are not deemed relevant to absolute welfare comparisons.  For example, better-off 
urban consumers may choose to cut their food spending to afford certain non-food goods that are 
not even available to rural consumers. 
We use two poverty lines, $32.74 and $65.48 per person per month, both at 1993 PPP, 
interpreted as the “$1 a day” and “$2 a day” lines ($1.08 and $2.15 more precisely).  The 
international rural line is converted to local currency by the Bank’s 1993 consumption PPP rate. 
We then use the ratio of the urban poverty line to the rural line from the PA (generally the one 
closest to 1993 if there is more than one) to obtain an urban poverty line for each country 
corresponding to its PPP-adjusted “$1 a day” rural line.
13   
                                                 
13   For example, the $1.08 a day at 1993 Purchasing Power Parity represents 1.53 Yuan per person in 
China, which is equivalent to 2.42 Yuan at 1999 prices; this is the rural poverty line used for the 1999 
household survey data for China.  The poverty lines used by the Bank’s Poverty Assessment for China 
imply an urban-rural differential of 1.37, so the urban poverty line for 1999 is 3.32 Yuan per person.   11
Taking the international poverty line to be the rural line rather than the urban line is a 
somewhat arbitrary choice, although is at least broadly consistent with the original idea of the 
“$1 a day” poverty line as a deliberately conservative line; indeed, the original set of poverty 
lines on which the World Bank’s international line was based were for rural areas (Ravallion et 
al., 1991; World Bank, 1990).  The precise line used by the Bank is $32.74 per month 
($1.08=$32.74x12/365 per day), which is the median of the lowest 10 poverty lines in the 
original compilation of (largely rural) poverty lines, as documented in Ravallion et al., (1991) 
(although the PPPs have been updated and revised since then; see Chen and Ravallion, 2004, for 
details).
14   By implication, our aggregate poverty count will tend to increase, given that urban 
poverty lines are generally above those for rural areas. 
Appendix 1 provides a more formal exposition of our approach, and how it differs from 
past methods of measuring the extent of the urbanization of poverty. 
Table 1 gives a regional summary of the poverty lines while Appendix 2 gives the urban-
rural poverty line differential by country. On average, the urban poverty line is about 30% higher 
than the rural line.  However, the numbers vary from region to region.  In Eastern European and 
Central Asia, the urban poverty line is only 5% higher on average while in Latin America and the 
Caribbean it is 44% higher on average.   
As can be seen in Figure 1, there is a tendency for poorer countries to have higher ratios 
of the urban line to the rural line; the correlation coefficient of the poverty-line ratio with the 
rural headcount index for $1 a day is 0.518 in 1993 (n=89); for the $2 a day headcount index the 
correlation is 0.521 (both are significant at better than the 1% level).  This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that internal market integration tends to improve as countries become less poor. 
  In all cases, the distributional data were in nominal terms, to which we applied the 
appropriate urban or rural poverty lines.  In two-thirds of cases, the PA gives explicit urban and 
rural poverty lines, and we used these to construct the COL ratio and (hence) the urban poverty 
                                                 
14   Chen and Ravallion (2001) also estimate the expected poverty line in the poorest country, which 
is $1.05 per day, although there is of course a variance around this estimate; the 95% confidence interval 
is ($0.88, $1.24).   12
line corresponding to the international rural line.  When explicit urban-rural lines were not 
reported in the PA, but a deflator was applied to adjust for the urban COL differential, we 
“backed out” the latter from the real and nominal consumption numbers given in the micro data 
(in some cases this was already done in the form of a price index in the data files).  When urban-
rural lines (either explicit or implicit) were not available, we applied the population-weighted 
regional average poverty-line differential to the country in question.  We used the country-
specific CPI’s to adjust the urban and rural index over time.  For most countries, we had little 
choice but to assume that the poverty line differential is constant over time; in only a few cases 
(though some of the largest countries, including China, India and Nigeria) did we have separate 
urban and rural CPIs, in order to calculate a date-specific urban-rural poverty line differential.  
Table 2 gives the numbers of countries in each data category at the regional level.   
We were able to derive rural and urban income/consumption per capita distributions for 
87 low- and middle-income countries from 208 household surveys representing 92% of the 
population of the developing world; Appendix 2 provides details on the country coverage and 
survey dates.
15   Of these, 157 are for consumption expenditure and 51 are for incomes. Within 
the 87 countries, 19 use only one distribution, 38 have two distributions while the rest (30) use at 
least three distributions over the period.
16  All the household surveys used here are national 
coverage except Argentina and Uruguay which only cover the urban population (though 90% or 
more of their populations live in urban areas). 
The use of a “per capita” normalization in measuring poverty is standard in the literature 
on developing countries; for example, virtually all of the PA’s use household income or 
                                                 
15   It was not feasible to obtain separate rural and urban distributions for all the countries used in 
Chen and Ravallion (2004) since for some we only have grouped data or in a few cases there is no rural-
urban identifier in the individual record data. So this is a subset of the data set we have compiled we have 
for 100 developing countries’ income or consumption distributions from 600 + household surveys 
spanning 1980 to 2004, which is an updated version of the data base described in Chen and Ravallion 
(2004); the data are available from the PovcalNet site: http://iresearch.worldbank.org/povcalnet. 
16   For some countries, we did not use all available surveys as some were not considered sufficiently 
comparable over time; there are examples for India, Mongolia, Cambodia, Malawi and Gambia.   13
consumption per capita, as have the past international “$1 a day” poverty counts.  Although the 
general presumption is that there is rather little scope for economies of size in consumption for 
poor people, Lanjouw and Ravallion (1995) have questioned that presumption.  Mean household 
size tends to be higher in rural than urban areas of developing countries, so introducing an 
allowance for economies of size in consumption will narrow the urban-rural differential in mean 
living standards.  We expect that this would also hold for poverty measures.  
Naturally the surveys are scattered over time.  We estimate the poverty measures for four 
years spanning the range of the data, namely 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2002.  We call these the 
“reference years.”  To estimate regional poverty at a given reference year we “line up” the 
surveys in time using the same method described in Chen and Ravallion (2004).  The latter paper 
also describes our interpolation method when the reference date is between two surveys.   
The urban population data are from the latest available issue of the WUP in 2006 (UN, 
2005).  As noted in the introduction, there are undoubtedly differences in the definitions used 
between countries, which we can do little about here.
17  The WUP estimates are based on actual 
enumerations whenever they are available.  The WUP web site provides details on data sources 
and how specific cases were handled; see http://esa.un.org/unup/. 
Using the household survey data, we could also draw urban population shares from each 
survey’s internal sample weights. We found that these two sets of weights differ for some 
countries. This was mainly a problem in the data for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  To test 
robustness we re-calculated the estimates for SSA using the survey-based urban population 
shares (giving results more consistent with Chen and Ravallion, 2004).  The rate of decline over 
time is somewhat higher using the census shares, but the difference is modest.
18 
 
                                                 
17   In some cases, the WUP made adjustments to assure consistency over time, but there do not 
appear to have been any adjustments between countries.  
18   For 1993, 1999 and 2002 the headcount indices for SSA were 51.28, 49.19 and 46.93% using 
census shares as compared to 51.42, 49.75 and 47.64% using the implicit weights from the survey data.   14
3.  The urbanization of poverty 1993-2002   
Tables 3 and 4 give our aggregate results.  Consistently with Claim 2, we find that rural 
poverty incidence is appreciably higher than urban. The “$1 a day” rural poverty rate in 2002 of 
30% is more than double the urban rate.  Similarly, while we find that 70% of the rural 
population lives below $2 a day, the proportion in urban areas is less than half that figure.  The 
rural share of poverty in 2002 is 75% using the $1 a day line, and slightly lower using the $2 
line.  This is higher than the widely-used estimate of 68% obtained by Ravallion (2002) using a 
population-weighted aggregate of the national poverty measures.  This is a non-negligible 
difference, representing the reclassification of over 80 million poor people from urban to rural.   
Over the period as a whole, we find a 5.5% point decline in the “$1 a day” poverty rate, 
from 27.8% in 1993 to 22.3% in 2002.  This was sufficient to reduce the overall count of the 
number of poor by about 100 million people. However, there is a marked difference between 
urban and rural areas.  The rural poverty rate fell much more than the rural rate.  The count of 
106 million fewer poor by the “$1 a day” standard is the net effect of a decline by 153 million in 
the number of rural poor and an increase of 47 million in the number of urban poor.  Similarly, 
the progress in reducing the total number of people living under $2 a day in rural areas by 117 
million came with an increase in the number of urban poor of 63 million, giving a net drop in the 
poverty count of only 54 million (Table 4).    
Our aggregate results point to a somewhat higher overall poverty rate, and a slightly 
lower rate of poverty reduction than found in Chen and Ravallion (2004).  On comparing our 
results for 1993 in Table 3 to the Chen-Ravallion estimates, using essentially the same methods 
but without allowing for an urban-rural differential in the cost-of-living, we find that a $1 a day 
headcount index that is about about 2.2% points higher in 1993 (27.8% versus 25.6%) and that it 
declines at a rate of about 0.6% points per year, as compared to 0.7% points.  The higher level is 
unsurprising (given that we have allowed for a higher poverty line in urban areas).  The lower 
pace of overall poverty reduction reflects the fact that the urban headcount index for $1 a day 
shows no trend decline (Table 3).  Thus, we find that past methods that have ignored the urban-  15
rural COL difference (including the Chen-Ravallion method) have underestimated poverty in a 
segment of the economy with a below average rate of poverty reduction over time, and (hence) 
they have slightly overestimated the overall speed of progress against poverty. 
The lack of a trend in the overall urban poverty rate implies that the main proximate 
causes of the overall decline in the poverty rate evident in Tables 3 and 4 are (i) urban population 
growth (at a given urban-rural poverty rate differential) and (ii) falling poverty incidence within 
rural areas.  To help quantify the relative importance of these factors one can decompose the 
change in overall poverty between 1993 and 2002 (say) as:
19 
   error S S w H H w H H w H H
u u s u u u r r r + − + − + − = − ) ( ) ( ) ( 93 02 93 02 93 02 93 02  (1) 
where  t H is the aggregate headcount index, 
k
t H  is that for sector k=u,r and t=(19)93, (20)02, 
and (as before) 
u S  is the urban population share.  The first two terms on the RHS are the sector 
contributions (with time-invariant weights 
u w  and 
r w ) while the third term ( ) ( 93 02
u u s S S w − ) is 
the urban-rural population shift effect (weighted by 
s w ), which we call the “urbanization 
component.”  The decomposition is exact (error=0) if we chose the weights 
k k S w 02 =  and 
) ( 93 93
r u s H H w − = .
20  Table 5 gives the results.   
We find that 4.2% points of the 5.5% point decline in the aggregate $1 a day poverty rate 
between 1993 and 2002 is attributed to lower rural poverty, 0.3% points to lower urban poverty, 
and 1.0% point to urbanization.  Three-quarters of the aggregate poverty reduction is accountable 
to falling poverty within rural areas.  One-fifth is attributed to urbanization. 
Note that this assessment does not allow for any indirect gains to the rural poor from 
urban population growth. The urbanization component in (1) can be interpreted as the direct 
contribution of a rising urban population share to total poverty reduction, given the initial 
                                                 
19   This is one of the decompositions for poverty measures proposed by Ravallion and Huppi (1991).  
20    One might prefer to use the initial population shares as the weights for the sector components, 
but this makes very little difference (the residual is small), and the exact decomposition is neater.   16
difference in urban and rural poverty measures.  However, the rural poverty reduction 
component is also the result (in part at least) of urban population growth, notably through 
remittances and tighter rural labor markets.  We return to this issue in section 4. 
3.1  Are the poor urbanizing faster than the population as a whole? 
For the “$1 a day” line, the aggregate results in Table 3 indicate that the urban share of 
the poor is rising (consistent with Claim 3) and that the ratio of urban poverty to total poverty 
incidence has risen with urbanization (implying Claim 4).  The value of  H H
u /  rises from 0.486 
to 0.573 over 1993-2002. The proportionate rate of growth is about 3% per year for the share of 
the poor living in urban areas, versus about 1% per year for the overall urban population share.
21  
There is naturally a smaller difference between the changes in the levels than for the 
(proportionate) growth rates.  We find that the urban share of the “$1 a day” poor is rising at 
about 0.6% points per year over 1993-2002.
22  By contrast the population as a whole is 
urbanizing at a rate of about 0.5% points per year over the same period.
23     
Using the “$2 a day” line, we find a slightly higher proportion of the poor living in urban 
areas, but that this proportion has been rising at a slower pace than for the $1 a day line; the 
share of the poor in urban areas is rising at about 0.3% points per year using the higher line — 
half the absolute rate implied by the $1 a day line.  Furthermore, over the period since the late 
1990s, Claim 3 is starting to look fragile for the $2 a day line; there is a sign of a deceleration in 
the urbanization of poverty in Table 4. The ratio of urban to total poverty rose only slightly, from 
0.618 to 0.620 between 1993 and 2002. Thus the rate of growth of the aggregate urban share of 
                                                 
21   The OLS regression coefficient of the log share of the “$1 a day” poor in urban areas on time is 
2.78% (s.e.=0.57) while for the log urban population share it is 1.17% (0.002). 
22   The OLS regression coefficient of the share of the poor in urban areas for the $1.08/day poverty 
line on time is 0.591 with a standard error of 0.105.   
23   The regressions coefficient of S
u on time is 0.469 (s.e.=0.005).  There is no sign of a deceleration 
in the rate of urbanization over this period, although there is evidence of a deceleration in urban 
population growth relative to prior decades; see Brockerhoff (1999).   17
the poor of about 1.2% per annum over 1993-2002 is very close to that for the population as a 
whole.
24  Claim 4 is not supported by our results for the $2 a day line.  
So neither Claims 3 nor 4 hold up as well for the $2 a day line as we find for $1 a day.  
Urban poverty reduction has clearly played a more important role in aggregate poverty reduction 
using the $2 line than the $1 line.  Of the total decline in the poverty rate for the higher line of 
8.9% points, 4.9% is attributed to rural poverty reduction (55% of the total), 2.3% to urban, and 
1.6% to the population shift effect (based on equation (1)). 
It is of interest to see what happens if we drop China from these calculations, given its 
size and the fact that China is unusual in a number of respects, notably in the low share of the 
poor living in urban areas and the slower pace in the urbanization of poverty compared to other 
developing countries.  Tables 3 and 4 also give the aggregate results excluding China.  As 
expected, we then find a higher urban share of the poor.  What is more notable is that we now 
find that  H H
u /  is rising over time using both poverty lines, supporting Claim 4; excluding 
China,  H H
u /  rises from 0.580 to 0.651 for $1 and 0.670 to 0.699 for $2 a day. 
We can also assess the validity of Claims 3 and 4 using the country-level estimates 
underlying Tables 3 and 4.  By definition, the share of the poor living in urban areas 
is
u u u u S H H S P ) / ( ) ( ≡ , where  H H
u /  is taken to be a function of the urban share of the 
population, 
u S ;   ) (
u u S P  is the poverty urbanization curve (PUC) of Ravallion (2002) where the 
derivation and properties is discussed further.  Log differentiating with respect to time, the 
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We can estimate the elasticity, 
u u S H H ln / ) / ln( ∂ ∂ , from the country-level estimates underlying 
Tables 3 and 4.  The estimated elasticity is 0.304 (s.e.=0.075; n=348) for the $1 a day line and 
                                                 
24   The regression coefficient of the log share of the poor in urban areas for the $2/day poverty line 
on time is 1.14% with a standard error of 0.37.   18
0.127 (0.0230; n=348) for the $2 line.  The fact that these elasticities are significantly positive 
implies that the poor urbanize faster than the population as a whole ( t S t S P
u u ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ / ln / ) ( ln ).  
While Claim 4 is confirmed, the difference in growth rates is small, especially for the $2 a day 
line.  Slightly higher elasticities are obtained if we allow for regional fixed effects; then the 
estimated elasticities increase to 0.398 (0.100) and 0.211 (0.040) for the $1 and $2 lines 
respectively.
25  (There was no sign of time effects.) 
  There are two proximate reasons why the poor are urbanizing faster: the first is that the 
proportionate difference between urban and rural poverty rates rises with urbanization, and the 
second is the size of the initial gap in poverty rates between the two sectors.  This can be verified 
on noting that: 
  
u






















    (3) 
Using regressions of the log poverty rate differential ( ) / ln(
r u H H ) on the log urban population 
share using the pooled data, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that  0 ln / ) / ln( = ∂ ∂
u r u S H H  
(the t-ratio is 1.21 for $1 and -0.001 for $2).  However, when we allow for regional effects we 
find that the second component is positive and significant; for the $1 a day headcount index, the 
regression coefficient is 0.268 (t=2.23), while it is 0.140 (t=2.57) for $2 a day.  This suggests that 
both factors are at work. 
3.2 Regional  differences 
It is evident from Tables 3 and 4 that Claim 2 holds in all regions for both lines, although 
there are notable differences across regions in the extent of the disparity in poverty rates between 
urban and rural areas.  In 2002, the rural headcount index for East Asia was nine times higher 
than the urban index, but only 16% higher in South Asia, the region with the lowest relative 
difference in poverty rates between the two sectors.  The contrast between China and India is 
                                                 
25   Note that the fact that these are un-weighted regressions entails that China gets a lower weight 
than the population-weighted aggregates in Tables 3 and 4; as we have already seen the aggregate results 
without China are more consistent with Claims 3 and 4, and with these regressions.   19
particularly striking, with an urban poverty rate in China in 2002 that is barely 4% of the rural 
rate, while it is 86% for India.  Urban poverty incidence in China is unusually low relative to 
rural, although problems in the available data for China are probably leading us to underestimate 
the urban share of the poor in that country.
26 
The regional differences in the urbanization of poverty are clear in Figure 2, plotting the 
urban share of the poor by region.  The share is lowest in East Asia, due in large part to China.  
The urban share of the poor is highest in LAC, which is the only region in which more of the “$1 
a day” poor live in urban than rural areas (the switch occurred in the mid-1990s).  For LAC, 
almost two-thirds of the $2 a day poor live in urban areas.   
South Asia and SSA are clearly the regions with highest urbanization of poverty at given 
overall urbanization, due to their relatively high urban poverty rates relative to rural; these are 
also the regions with the highest overall poverty rates.  In 2002, 44% of the world’s urban poor 
by the $1 a day line are found in South Asia, and 35% are found in SSA; these proportions fall 
appreciably when one focuses on the $2 a day line, for which 39% and 22% of the urban poor are 
found in South Asia and SSA respectively. 
There are other notable regional differences.  In the aggregate and in most regions, 
poverty incidence fell in both sectors over the period as a whole (though with greater progress 
against rural poverty in the aggregate).  LAC and SSA are exceptions.  There rising urban 
poverty came with falling rural poverty. The (poverty-reducing) population shift and rural 
components of equation (1) for LAC and SSA were offset by the (poverty-increasing) urban 
component. 
While the urban poverty rate for the developing world as a whole was relatively stagnant 
over time for $1 a day, this is not what we find in all regions.  Indeed, the urban poverty rate is 
                                                 
26   The main problem is that (until recently) the sample frame for China’s national urban and rural 
surveys has been based on the registration system rather than street addresses.  Thus recent migrants to 
urban areas are thus likely to be undercounted in the urban surveys since their registration will still be 
rural. On the (plausible) assumption that rural migrants are poorer than the average urban resident, we 
will underestimate urban poverty incidence.    20
falling relative to the national rate in both East Asia and ECA, attenuating the urbanization of 
poverty; indeed, in ECA the urban share of the poor is actually falling over time — a 
“ruralization” of poverty — even while the urban share of the total population has risen, though 
only slightly.  (There is the hint of a ruralization of $2 a day poverty in East Asia from the late 
1990s, again due to China.)  The ruralization of poverty in ECA is not surprising, as it is 
consistent with other evidence suggesting that the economic transition process in this region has 
favored urban areas over rural areas (World Bank, 2005).  This has also been the case in China 
since the mid-1990s (Ravallion and Chen, 2007).    
South Asia shows no trend in either direction in the urban poverty rate relative to the 
national rate, and the region has also had a relatively low overall urbanization rate, with little 
sign of a trend increase in the urban share of the poor.  The population shift component of the 
decomposition in equation (1) is also relatively less important in South Asia.   
The urban poverty rate relative to the national rate has shown no clear trend in Sub-
Saharan Africa, although rapid urbanization of the population as a whole has meant that a rising 
share of the poor are living in urban areas.   
Using the country level estimates underlying Tables 3 and 4 we can also estimate the 
elasticity of  H H
u /  to 
u S  by region.  Table 7 gives the results.  Two regions stand out as 
exceptions to Claim 4: ECA and MNA.  In ECA we find that the elasticity is not significantly 
different from zero in the country-level data set; this is also true for MNA using $2 a day, but we 
find a significant negative elasticity for $1 a day, implying that the poor are urbanizing at a 
significantly lower rate than the population as a whole. 
3.3  Urban and rural poverty gaps 
So far we have focused on the headcount index.  While this is the most common measure 
in practice, it has the well-known conceptual drawback that it does not reflect changes in living 
standards below the poverty line.  Table 8 gives the poverty gap (PG) indices for both poverty 
lines.   The overall patterns are similar to Tables 3 and 4, and most of the same comments apply.  
The urban share of the total poverty gap — the urban poverty gap times the urban population   21
share divided by the total (urban + rural) poverty gap — has risen over time, with about three-
quarters of the overall poverty gap found in rural areas in 2002 (slightly lower for $1 a day than 
$2).  One difference is that the $1 a day poverty gap in South Asia is not becoming any more 
urban over time, though this is evident for the higher poverty line. 
While our results for both the headcount index and poverty gap index (and both poverty 
lines) confirm Claim 2, there is a qualification to be noted.  Among those living below the 
poverty line, the mean poverty gap turns out to be higher in urban areas than in rural areas, using 
the $1 a day line.  The mean income of those living below this line in 2002 was $0.73 in urban 
areas as compared to $0.77 in rural areas (combining Tables 8 and 3).
27 The ranking is the same 
in other years, but switches at the $2 a day poverty line. 
 
4. Population  urbanization and poverty reduction 
We do not attempt a causal analysis of the poverty impacts of urbanization, but we can 
offer some empirical observations from our data that are at least consistent with Claim 5.   
It is clear from Table 3 that different regions are urbanizing at rather different rates over 
time.  These differences are correlated with rates of poverty reduction.  Using the country-level 
estimates for all years, Figure 3 plots of the $1 and $2 a day poverty rates against the urban 
population shares.  There is a strong negative correlation. Figure 4 gives the corresponding 
figures with a split of the urban and rural sectors.  We see that both urban and rural poverty rates 
tend to be lower at higher urban population shares, but there is also a clear sign of convergence, 
such that the absolute gap between the urban and rural poverty rates tends to be lower at higher 
levels of urbanization; the regression coefficient of 
r u H H −  on 
u S  is 0.241 (s.e.=0.033; n=340) 
for the $1 a day line and 0.262 (s.e.=0.036; n=340) for the $2 line.
28   
                                                 
27   This calculation uses the fact that the mean income of the poor is given by Z(1-PG/H).     
28   There is also evidence that the child health advantages of cities over towns and villages (as 
measured by infant mortality rates) have tended to diminish over time (Brockerhoff and Brennan, 1998).   22
Figures 3 and 4 could be deceptive if population urbanization is correlated with country 
or regional characteristics relevant to poverty.  To address this concern we use a “difference-in-
difference” estimator, whereby the urban and rural poverty rates are regressed on the urban 
population share including additive fixed effects (a dummy variable for each region or country), 
i.e., the mean level of poverty at a given urban population share is allowed to vary by region or 
country; Table 6 gives the results.
29  Both poverty measures tend to decline as the urban 
population share rises, although the effect are generally smaller (but more significant) for the 
country data.
30   
Amongst the six regions of the developing world, SSA also stands out as an exception to 
our finding that urbanization has come with falling overall poverty.  Splitting the regression 
coefficient of the aggregate headcount index for pooled regions and dates on the urban 
population share between SSA and the rest (with regional fixed effects) we find that the 
coefficient is -0.396 (0.335) for SSA versus -1.115 (0.432) for non-SSA regions.  The 
urbanization effect is on rural poverty, with no effect on urban poverty in SSA and only a small 
effect in non-SSA.
31 
One can question a strict causal interpretation of these regressions.  It is unlikely to be 
population urbanization per se that is leading to lower poverty, but rather the economic 
opportunities that can come with urbanization, both directly (to migrants) and indirectly (to non-
                                                 
29   As a further test, we repeated the regressions in Table 6 allowing for an independent time trend, 
but we found a similar pattern, suggesting that the significant regression coefficients on urban population 
share for both national and rural poverty; the urbanization effect is not just picking up a trend reduction in 
poverty.  The regression coefficients on the urban population share were -0.934 (0.386), -1.107 (0.462) 
and -0.206 (0.161) for the national, rural and urban $1 a day headcount indices respectively. 
30   For completeness, Table 6 gives the regression for the national poverty measures, but it should be 
noted that an identity links the urban and rural measures and urban population share to the national 
measure.  A consistent regression for the national poverty measure would include a squared term in the 
urban population share; we also tested this specification, and the results were consistent with 
expectations.    
31   For rural poverty the regression coefficient is -0.407 (0.278) in SSA versus -1.344 (0.515) in non-
SSA.  For urban poverty the corresponding coefficients are -0.014 (0.473) and -0.271 (0.143).   23
migrants in rural areas). All we can reasonably claim from these results is that the data are at 
least consistent with the view that urbanization plays a positive role in overall poverty reduction. 
While the precise channels through which population urbanization influences poverty 
reduction are a subject for future research, one question of interest can be addressed relatively 
easily: Do we find that population urbanization had an effect on the pace of poverty reduction 
independently of overall growth in mean consumption?  In other words, is there evidence of a 
distributional effect of urbanization, or is its effect transmitted entirely through economic 
growth?  One reason to expect a distributional effect draws on the literature in development 
economics on the Kuznets Hypothesis.  Some of our empirical results so far do not accord well 
with the assumptions typically used to motivate the KH.  The now classic formulation in the 
literature posits what is sometimes called a “Kuznets process” of migration whereby a 
representative slice of the rural distribution is transformed into a representative slice of the urban 
distribution; yet we find signs that the urbanization process has changed distribution within 
urban areas.  Nonetheless, it is of interests to see if there any signs of a distributional effect of 
urbanization, as implied by the KH.  To do so we regress the log national headcount index on a 
quadratic function of both the log mean and the urban population share:  
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i
t μ  is the mean for sector i=r,u for rural and 
urban areas, and  i η  is a country fixed effect.  This can be thought of as a test for the KH in 
which the relevant “inequality” measure is the distributional component of poverty.
32 
Table 9 gives the results.  The estimates for the β  parameters are (highly) significant.  
We also find a (mildly) significant positive interaction effect between the log mean and the urban 
population share, implying that urbanization tends to reduce the growth elasticity of poverty 
                                                 
32   The presence of a country effect in this test is important; for further discussion, and evidence that 
the KH does not hold when one allows for country effects see Bruno et al. (1998); for a good review of 
the evidence on the KH see Fields (2001, Chapter 3).   24
reduction (prob.=0.015 for $1 and 0.018 for $2).  However, we cannot reject the null hypotheses 
that  0 2 1 = = = δ γ γ  for either “$1 a day” (prob.=0.085) or “$2 a day” (prob.=0.160).     
These tests suggest that the main channel connecting population urbanization to poverty 
is through aggregate economic growth.  This was also true for each region separately except for 
SSA, where for the $2 a day line we could reject the above null, though only at the 2% level 
(prob.=0.0176).    
 
5.  On the future urbanization of poverty 
  The latest WUP predicts that the urban share of the population of the developing world 
will reach 60% by 2030 (UN, 2005).  Critics of the WUP forecasting methods have argued that 
they are likely to overestimate the pace of future urbanization (National Research Council, 2003; 
Bocquier, 2005).  This is suggested by Cohen’s (2004) observation that the urban population of 
the developing world in 2000 was appreciably lower than the WUP predictions for that year 
made in both 1990 and 1980.  Bocquier’s (2005) alternative forecasting method predicts a much 
slower pace of urbanization, with the urban population share rising to only 49% in 2030.
33   
There are reasons to be skeptical of all such forecasts, but this is not the place to dwell on 
such concerns.  All we want to do here is to see what implications current forecasts for urban 
population growth hold for future trends in the urbanization of poverty, in the light of our new 
data set.  To do so we need to link the growth rate of the urban population to the urbanization of 
poverty.  That link is directly provided by the PUC,  ) (
u u S P . Ravallion (2002) proposes the 
following cubic specification for the PUC:  
u u u u u S S S S P ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 [ ) (
2 − + − + = γ β       ( 5 )  
                                                 
33   The methodological issue raised by Bocquier relates to the extent of nonlinearity in the 
relationship between the urban-rural growth difference and the urban population share; the UN’s methods 
assume linearity; Bocquier presents evidence suggesting that it is a nonlinear relationship, which he then 
allows for in his own forecasting method.    25
This has the desired theoretical properties — notably that the function  (.)
u P  maps from [0,1] to 
[0,1] —  and sufficient flexibility to represent the data.     
On adding an error term and estimating a pooled model over all four years, with different 
parameters for each year, we could not reject the null hypothesis that  0 = +γ β  in equation (5).  
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2=0.460    (6) 
We also allowed β  to vary by year, but could not reject the null hypothesis that the parameter is 
constant over time.
34  Figure 5(a) plots the data and fitted values based on (6). 
For the $2 poverty line, the coefficient on the squared term was not significantly different 
from zero (t=1.115).  Imposing this restriction we settled on the following model for the $2 line: 







u S S S P ε ˆ )] 1 ( 394 . 0 1 [ ) (
) 029 . 0 ( + − − =   n=348; R
2=0.777    (7) 
Again, we could not reject the null of parameter constancy over time.
35  Figure 5(b) plots the 
data and fitted values based on equation (7). 
The fit is noticeably better for the $2 line.  The $1 a day measures are very low for some 
middle-income countries in the sample, and the accuracy of our estimates of the share of poverty 
in urban areas is questionable at low levels of poverty.  As one test for robustness we re-
estimated equation (6) on a truncated sample for which the $1 a day headcount index exceeded 
2%.  The overall fit improved appreciably, with R
2 rising to 0.615 and the estimated coefficient 
was -1.196 (s.e.=0.107; n=270). 
  The intertemporal stability of the PUC gives us some confidence in using it as a 
forecasting tool, for given projections of the urban population share.  Recall that the WUP 
predicts that the urban population share for the developing world will reach 60% by 2030 (UN, 
                                                 
34   The parameter estimates were -1.306 (s.e.=0.245), -1.494 (0.226), -1.581 (0.217) and -1.411 
(0.220) for 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2002 respectively. 
35   The estimates were -0.413 (0.055), -0.389 (0.055), -0.391 (0.055) and -0.382 (0.055) for 1993, 
1996, 1999 and 2002 respectively.   26
2005).  If poverty urbanizes in the future consistently with the relationship modeled above, then 
the urban share of “$1 a day” poverty will reach 39% at that date, with a standard error of 1.6%.  
(This rises to 43% for the truncated sample with poverty rates over 2%.)  For the higher poverty 
line, the urban share of the poor will be 51% by 2030 with a standard error of 0.7%.   
For the $1 a day line, these estimates are very close to what one obtains by the simplest 
linear extrapolation.  At the rate of increase in the urban share of the world’s “$1 a day” poor of 
0.6% points per year implied by Table 3, the share will rise from 25% in 2002 to 42% by 2030.  
A majority of the poor will be found in rural areas until about 2040.  However, at the pace of 
urbanization found for the $2 poverty rate that we find in Table 4, a majority of the poor will live 
in rural areas for another 80 years or so!  The signs of deceleration in the urbanization of the $2 a 
day poor in Table 4 also point to a slower future rate than suggested by the above calculations 
based on the WUP projections and our PUC’s. 
Systematic errors in the UN’s projections for the urban population share will, of course, 
bias these forecasts for the future urbanization of poverty.  As already noted, the critical 
assessments of the UN’s forecasts have argued that they are likely to overestimate the pace of 
future urbanization.  The alternative forecasts by Bocquier (2005) predict that the urban 
population share will only rise to 49% by 2030.  Inserting this into our PUC implies that the 
urban share of the “$1 a day” poor will rise to only 31% by that date (standard error of 1.4%), 
while for the $2 line it rises to 39% (s.e.=0.7%). 
These projections should clearly not be taken too seriously. Narrowing down the range of 
estimates would certainly require a credible economic model, since the pace of urbanization will 
undoubtedly depend on the extent and pattern of future economic growth.  However, from what 
we currently know, it appears very likely that the bulk of the poor will still be living in rural 
areas for at least a few decades to come.  
 
6.   Conclusions 
Widely heard concerns about the urbanization of poverty in the developing world have 
been neither well informed by data nor cognizant of the broader economic role of urbanization in   27
the process of overall poverty reduction. To help address these issues, we have provided new 
estimates of the urban-rural breakdown of absolute poverty measures for the developing world, 
drawing on over 200 household surveys for about 90 countries, and exploiting the World Bank’s 
Poverty Assessments for guidance on the urban-rural cost-of-living differential facing poor 
people, to supplement existing estimates of the Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates for 
consumption.   
We estimate that about three-quarters of the developing world’s poor still live in rural 
areas, when assessed by international poverty lines that aim to have a constant real value 
(between countries and between urban and rural areas within countries).  Poverty is clearly 
becoming more urban, although our results suggest that it will be many decades before a 
majority of the developing world’s poor live in urban areas.   
The poor are urbanizing faster than the population as a whole, reflecting a lower-than-
average pace of urban poverty reduction.  One’s concern about the seemingly low pace of urban 
poverty reduction in much of the developing world must be relieved by the fact that it has come 
with more rapid progress against rural poverty.  Over 1993-2002, while 50 million people were 
added to the count of $1 a day poor in urban areas, the aggregate count of the poor fell by about 
100 million, thanks to a decline of 150 million in the number of rural poor.   
Although our analysis has been descriptive, rather than attempting to draw causal 
inferences, the empirical findings are broadly consistent with the view that the urbanization 
process has played a quantitatively-important positive role in overall poverty reduction, by 
providing new opportunities to rural out-migrants (some of whom escape poverty in the process) 
and through the second-round impact of urbanization on the living standards of those who 
remain in rural areas.  What we see here is suggestive of a compositional effect on the changing 
urban population, whereby the slowing of urban poverty reduction is the “other side of the coin” 
to what is in large part a poverty-reducing process of urbanization.  Nor do we find any sign of 
adverse distributional effects of urbanization; instead it seems that the main channel linking 
population urbanization to poverty reduction is the rate of economic growth. Yes, the poor are   28
gravitating to towns and cities, but more rapid poverty reduction through economic growth will 
probably entail an even faster pace of urbanization.  
We find some marked regional differences in a number of respects.  The majority of 
Latin America’s poor live in urban areas, while it is less than 10% in East Asia (due mainly to 
China).  The pattern of falling overall poverty with urbanization is far less evident in Sub-
Saharan Africa, where the population (including the poor) has been urbanizing, yet with little 
reduction in aggregate poverty.  There are also exceptions at the regional level to the overall 
pattern of poverty’s urbanization; indeed, we find signs of a ruralization of poverty in China and 
in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.   
Our results also have implications for assessments of overall progress against poverty.  
Compared to past estimates ignoring urban-rural cost-of-living differences, we find a somewhat 
higher aggregate poverty count for the world, and a somewhat lower pace of poverty reduction.  
These differences stem from the higher cost-of-living and the slower pace of poverty reduction in 
urban areas revealed by our study.   29
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Figure 2: Urbanization of poverty by region 
            (a) “$1 a day” poverty line 
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Figure 3: National headcount indices plotted against urban population share (countries and 
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Figure 4: Urban and rural headcount indices plotted against urban population shares 
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Figure 5: Urban share of the poor against urban population share (countries and years) 
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Table 1: Population-weighted urban poverty lines in 1993 PPP 
 
Urban poverty line ($/day; 1993 PPP) 
corresponding to a rural line of: 
 $1.08    $2.15 
East-Asia and Pacific 
(EAP) 1.40    2.79 
Eastern-Europe and 
Central Asia (ECA)  1.13    2.27 
Latin America and 
Caribbean (LAC)  1.55    3.10 
Middle East and North 
Africa (MNA)  1.19    2.37 
South Asia (SAS)  1.40    2.79 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)  1.39    2.77 
Total 1.39    2.79 
 
 
Table 2: Number of countries by type of data 







Implicit in  
data files 
No. countries for 
which regional 
mean is used 
EAP 8  7  0  1 
ECA 21  12  19  1 
LAC 21  12  0  9 
MNA 6  5  0  1 
SAS 5  4  1  0 
SSA 26  13  5  8 
Total 87  42  25  20 
Note: For region identifiers see Table 1. 
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Table 3: Urban and rural poverty measures using a poverty line of $1.08/day (in 1993 PPP)  
  Number of poor in millions  Headcount index (%) 









1993              
EAP  28.71 407.17 435.88 5.55 35.47 26.17 6.59  31.09 
   China  10.98  331.38  342.36 3.33 39.05 29.05 3.21  29.77 
ECA 6.12  6.37  12.49 2.06 3.66 2.65 48.98  63.06 
LAC  26.07 28.55 54.62 7.82 22.38 11.85 47.73  72.33 
MNA  0.77 4.29 5.07 0.61 3.76 2.09 15.29  52.82 
SAS  107.48 383.30 490.78 35.30 43.55 41.43 21.90  25.70 
   India  94.28  324.55  418.83 40.06 48.88 46.57 22.51  26.17 
SSA  66.42 206.73 273.15 40.21 53.07 49.24 24.32  29.78 
Total  235.58 1036.41 1271.99 13.50 36.58 27.78 18.52  38.12 
Less  China  224.60 705.03 929.63 15.86 35.53 27.34 24.16  41.64 
1996             
EAP  19.34 264.54 283.88 3.34 23.00 16.41 6.81  33.49 
   China  6.59  204.60  211.20 1.68 24.80 17.35 3.12  32.24 
ECA 7.77  9.15  16.93 2.60 5.26 3.58 45.93  63.19 
LAC  31.34 28.95 60.29 8.79 22.67 12.44 51.98  73.64 
MNA  0.75 5.05 5.80 0.53 4.23 2.24 12.88  53.92 
SAS  115.43 384.97 500.40 34.82 41.63 39.84 23.07  26.39 
   India  103.06  324.75  427.81 40.52 46.77 45.09 24.09  26.81 
SSA  82.32 221.37 303.69 43.41 53.97 50.63 27.11  31.62 
Total 256.96  914.02  1170.98 13.56 31.45 24.39 21.94  39.47 
Less  China  250.36 709.42 959.78 16.66 42.02 26.78 26.09  41.93 
1999             
EAP  19.53 268.24 287.76 3.02 23.46 16.08 6.79  36.10 
   China  6.93  220.78  227.71 1.59 27.00 18.16 3.04  34.89 
ECA  7.42 10.65 18.07 2.48 6.11 3.81 41.08  63.23 
LAC  33.90 29.85 63.75 8.91 23.50 12.57 53.18  74.97 
MNA  1.31 5.17 6.47 0.87 4.19 2.37 20.18  54.83 
SAS  120.15 402.40 522.55 33.41 41.59 39.37 22.99  27.10 
   India  102.51  321.06  423.58 37.38 44.30 42.40 24.20  27.45 
SSA  92.05 228.85 320.90 42.57 53.14 49.61 28.69  33.43 
Total 274.36  945.15  1219.51 13.37 31.87 24.31 22.50  40.89 
Less  China  267.42 724.38 991.80 16.56 33.72 26.35 26.96  42.92 
2002             
EAP  16.27 223.23 239.50 2.28 19.83 13.03 6.79  38.79 
   China  4.00  175.01  179.01 0.80 22.44 13.98 2.24  37.68 
ECA  2.48 4.94 7.42 0.83 2.87 1.57 33.40  63.45 
LAC  38.33 26.60 64.93 9.49 21.15 12.26 59.03  76.24 
MNA  1.21 4.88 6.09 0.75 3.82 2.11 19.87  55.75 
SAS  125.40 394.34 519.74 32.21 39.05 37.15 24.13  27.83 
   India  106.64  316.42  423.06 36.20 41.96 40.34 25.21  28.09 
SSA  98.84 228.77 327.61 40.38 50.86 47.17 30.17  35.24 
Total 282.52  882.77  1165.29 12.78 29.32 22.31 24.24  42.34 
Less  China  278.52 707.76 986.28 16.28 31.72 25.02 28.24  43.40 
Note: For region identifiers see Table 1.  39
Table 4: Urban and rural poverty measures using a poverty line of $2.15/day (in 1993 PPP)  
  Number of poor in millions  Headcount index (%) 
 Urban  Rural  Total  Urban  Rural  Total 
Urban share 
of the poor 
(%) 
1993           
EAP 199.84  976.38  1176.22 38.60 85.07 70.62  16.99 
   China  117.33  752.19  869.52 35.57 88.64 73.79  13.49 
ECA 43.60  34.49  78.09 14.68 19.83 16.58  55.83 
LAC 75.92  60.35  136.28 22.77 47.30 29.56  55.71 
MNA 15.96  40.82  56.78 12.49 35.75 23.46  28.11 
SAS 237.38  770.65  1008.02 77.97 87.56 85.09  23.55 
   India  193.65  607.54  801.19 82.28 91.50 89.09  24.17 
SSA 110.45  331.96  442.41 66.86 85.22 79.75  24.97 
Total 683.15  2214.65  2897.80 39.14 78.17 63.29  23.57 
Less China  565.83 1462.46  2028.28 39.97 73.69 59.65 27.90 
1996             
EAP 169.18  812.09  981.26 29.21 70.60 56.73  17.24 
   China  101.47  598.05  699.52 25.85 72.49 57.45  14.51 
ECA 49.77  39.81  89.59 16.67 22.90 18.96  55.56 
LAC 95.61  61.17  156.78 26.80 47.89 32.36  60.98 
MNA 17.57  44.78  62.34 12.58 37.53 24.08  28.18 
SAS 259.94  813.58  1073.52 78.42 87.99 85.46  24.21 
   India  215.45  629.45  844.90 84.70 90.65 89.05  25.50 
SSA 131.64  346.62  478.25 69.42 84.51 79.74  27.52 
Total 723.70  2118.04  2841.74 38.19 72.88 59.19  25.47 
Less China  622.23 1519.99  2142.21 41.41 90.02 59.78 29.05 
1999             
EAP 166.03  796.67  962.69 25.70 69.68 53.81  17.25 
   China  89.22  593.80  683.02 20.46 72.62 54.48  13.06 
ECA 50.07  44.46  94.53 16.72 25.53 19.96  52.97 
LAC 102.65  61.56  164.21 26.99 48.47 32.36  62.51 
MNA 20.73  48.81  69.54 13.85 39.57 25.47  29.81 
SAS 270.88  846.45  1117.33 75.32 87.48 84.19  24.24 
   India  218.06  649.41  867.47 79.52 89.60 86.83  25.14 
SSA 150.54  362.76  513.30 69.63 84.24 79.36  29.33 
Total 760.90  2160.71  2921.61 37.09 72.85 58.23  26.04 
Less China  671.68 1566.91  2238.60 41.58 72.94 59.48 30.00 
2002             
EAP 126.71  711.45  838.16 17.77 63.21 45.59  15.12 
   China  53.45  507.48  560.93 10.68 65.07 43.81  9.53 
ECA 32.07  32.22  64.29 10.71 18.69 13.63  49.88 
LAC 109.25  58.36  167.61 27.06 46.39 31.65  65.18 
MNA 19.90  48.12  68.02 12.36 37.64 23.54  29.25 
SAS 290.29  876.30  1166.59 74.56 86.78 83.38  24.88 
   India  229.91  667.89  897.80 78.05 88.57 85.62  25.61 
SSA 167.72  370.83  538.55 68.52 82.45 77.54  31.14 
Total 745.94  2097.29  2843.23 33.73 69.65 54.44  26.24 
Less China  692.48 1589.81  2282.30 40.48 71.25 57.89 30.34 
Note: For region identifiers see Table 1.  40
Table 5: Decomposition of the change in poverty 1993-2002 
 Decomposition 
 
Total change in 
headcount index 
1993-2002  
(% points)  Rural sector Urban sector 
Population 
shift 
$1.08/day        
EAP -13.14  -9.57  -1.27  -2.31 
    China  -15.07  -11.04  -1.02  -3.01 
ECA -1.08  -0.29  -0.78  -0.01 
LAC 0.41  -0.29  1.27  -0.57 
MNA 0.01  0.03  0.08  -0.09 
SAS -4.28  -3.28  -0.87  -0.14 
    India  -6.23  -5.01  -1.09  -0.12 
SSA -2.07  -1.43  0.06  -0.70 
Total -5.47  -4.20  -0.31  -0.96 
$2.15/day        
EAP -25.03  -13.37  -8.08  -3.58 
    China  -29.98  -15.58  -9.95  -4.45 
ECA -2.96  -0.42  -2.52  -0.02 
LAC 2.09  -0.22  3.27  -0.96 
MNA 0.08  0.84  -0.08  -0.68 
SAS -1.72  -0.57  -0.96  -0.18 
    India  -3.47  -2.12  -1.20  -0.15 
SSA -2.21  -1.79  0.58  -1.00 
Total -8.85  -4.92  -2.29  -1.64 
Note: For region identifiers see Table 1. 
 
 
Table 6: Regression coefficients of poverty measures on urban population shares 
  $1 a day poverty line  $2 a day poverty line 































Note: Both poverty measures and urban population share in %.  The first number in parentheses is the 
White standard error, the second number is the prob. value; all regressions included regional or country 
fixed effects.   41
Table 7: Estimated elasticities of  H H
u /  to 
u S  by region 
Region  $1 a day  $2 a day 
    
EAP 1.419  0.270 
  (0.489; 0.007; 32)  (0.104; 0.015; 32) 
    
ECA 0.170  0.261 
  (0.441; 0.701; 84)  (0.228; 0.257; 84) 
    
LAC 1.094  0.462 
  (0.481; 0.026; 84)  (0.124; 0.000; 84) 
    
MNA -0.443  -0.038 
  (0.114; 0.001; 24)  (0.152; 0.803; 24) 
    
SAS 0.484  0.457 
  (0.130; 0.002; 20)  (0.078; 0.000; 20) 
    
SSA 0.184  0.154 
  (0.075; 0.016; 104)  (0.045; 0.001; 104) 
    
Total   0.304  0.127 
  (0.075; 0.000; 348)  (0.023; 0.000; 348) 
0.398 0.211  With regional 
fixed effects  (0.100; 0.000; 348)  (0.040; 0.000; 348) 
Note: The first number in parentheses is the White standard error, the second 
number is the prob. value and the third is the number of observations.  The last 
row gives the regression for the total sample including a complete set of regional 
fixed effects. For region identifiers see Table 1.  42
Table 8: Poverty gap indices for urban and rural areas  
         $1.08/day poverty line      $2.15/day poverty line 
  Poverty gap index (%)      Poverty gap index (%)   
 Urban  Rural  Total   
Urban 
share of 




1993               
EAP  1.16  9.03  6.58  5.48  11.03 37.52  29.28    11.70 
   China  0.67  10.1  7.46   2.50    9.15 40.22  31.52    8.12 
ECA 0.50  0.92  0.66   48.30    4.05 5.94  4.75    53.79 
LAC 2.65  9.48  4.54   42.21    8.95 22.38  12.67    51.12 
MNA 0.14  0.36  0.24   29.47    2.76 7.62  5.05    28.81 
SAS 9.65  11.60  11.10   22.36    35.04 41.34  39.72    22.67 
   India  11.09  12.83  12.37   23.46    38.30 44.71  43.03    23.29 
SSA 20.17  22.14  21.55   27.87    35.93 47.34  43.94    24.35 
Total 4.54  10.80  8.41   20.56    15.38 36.23  28.28    20.73 
Less China  5.44  11.10  8.75   25.90    16.83 34.53  27.16    25.81 
1996                    
EAP  0.69  5.14  3.65  6.36   7.73 27.22  20.69    12.51 
   China  0.32  5.44  3.79   2.75    6.03 28.45  21.22    9.16 
ECA 0.62  1.40  0.91   43.34    4.81 7.44  5.78    52.60 
LAC 2.67  9.46  4.46   44.10    10.49 22.61  13.69    56.45 
MNA 0.10  0.84  0.44   12.16    2.65 10.08  6.08    23.53 
SAS 9.36  11.25  10.75   22.97    34.79 42.61  40.54    22.64 
   India  11.22  13.09  12.59   23.89    39.07 46.24  44.32    23.63 
SSA 20.28  24.02  22.84   28.08    39.29 48.16  45.35    27.39 
Total 4.49  9.54  7.54   23.47    15.31 32.98  26.00    23.23 
Less China  5.57  11.16  8.82   26.50    17.73 34.78  27.63    26.91 
1999                    
EAP  0.68  5.51  3.77  6.48   6.86 27.20  19.86    12.48 
   China  0.35  6.34  4.25   2.87    4.87 29.51  20.94    8.08 
ECA 0.56  1.95  1.07   33.14    4.73 8.56  6.14    48.74 
LAC 2.66  9.79  4.45   44.91    10.32 23.40  13.59    56.91 
MNA 0.17  0.77  0.44   20.61    3.18 10.78  6.61    26.33 
SAS 9.09  10.48  10.10   24.39    33.41 40.40  38.50    23.51 
   India  10.36  10.95  10.78   26.36    36.33 42.11  40.52    24.61 
SSA 19.20  23.63  22.15   28.98    38.57 47.56  44.56    28.93 
Total 4.42  9.54  7.45   24.26    14.92 32.52  25.32    24.09 
Less  China  5.52  10.76  8.51   27.83    17.63 33.67 26.79   28.25 
2002                    
EAP  0.54  4.42  2.92  7.16   4.74 23.79  16.41    11.21 
   China  0.238  4.96  3.11   2.99    2.331 25.341  16.35    5.57 
ECA 0.21  0.67  0.38   34.82    2.55 5.38  3.58    45.13 
LAC 3.01  8.60  4.33   52.86    10.46 21.44  13.07    61.03 
MNA 0.15  0.74  0.41   19.98    2.79 10.06  6.01    25.92 
SAS 8.67  9.18  9.04   26.71    32.66 39.02  37.25    24.40 
   India  10.04  10.03  10.03   28.10    35.38 40.77  39.26    25.32 
SSA 16.67  22.53  20.46   28.70    36.56 45.84  42.57    30.27 
Total 4.13  8.53  6.67   26.25    13.79 30.46  23.40    24.95 
Less China  5.27  9.77  7.82   29.26    17.14 32.24 25.69   28.95   43
Table 9:  Test for distributional effects of urbanization on poverty  
  μ ln   2 ) (lnμ  
u S  
2 u S   μ ln



























Note: Prob. value based on robust standard errors in parentheses.  All regressions included a constant 
term. N=348. 
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Appendix 1: Theoretical exposition 
To outline our approach in more precise terms, let 
r Z  denote the international rural 
poverty line, which is fixed across all countries on the basis of existing PPP exchange rates; for 
example, this might be “$1 a day” in international PPP $’s.  Our international urban poverty line 
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k
i Z  is the national poverty line for sector k=u,r in country i, 
based on the PA.  The aggregate international headcount indices of rural and urban poverty 
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where 
k
i S  is country i’s share of the total population in sector k and 
k
i F  is the cumulative 
distribution of consumption in sector k of country i (
k
i F  is a non-decreasing function for all k 
and i). The “global” aggregate headcount index is then 
u u r r H S H S H + = .  The urban share of 
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u u u / ≡  globally.   
How will our change in methodology affect existing poverty measures?  Consider first 
the international (“$1 a day”) measures.  For these, our change will obviously increase the 




i Z Z ≥  for all i. The change will also increase 
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i P  for all i.  
The outcome is less obvious when the comparison is made with the national measures:  
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(Here we use the subscript “PA” to signify the urban and rural poverty measures based on the 
national poverty lines used in the country-specific PA’s.)  There is nothing very general one can 
say about the effect of switching from the national poverty lines to the international lines as this 
will clearly depend on the level of the international line as well as the properties of the 
distribution functions, 
k
i F .  However some special cases are instructive.  Suppose that the 
international rural line is set at the lower bound of the national poverty lines.  Clearly then both   45
the urban and rural international poverty measures (based on (A1)) will be no higher than those 
based on the aggregation of national measures (based on (A2).  (This reverses when the 
international line is set at the upper bound of the national lines.)  This case is of interest given 
that (as noted above) the “$1 a day” line is deliberately conservative, in that it is intended to be a 
poverty line appropriate to the poorest countries (Ravallion et al., 1991; World Bank, 1990).  The 
implication for the share of total poverty found in rural areas is theoretically ambiguous. 
  Note, however, that the $1 a day line is not strictly a lower bound, but rather an average 
of the lines found amongst low-income countries.  The precise line used by the Bank is the 
median of the lowest 10 poverty lines in the original compilation of (largely rural) poverty lines, 
as documented in Ravallion et al., (1991) (although the PPPs have been updated and revised 
since then; see Chen and Ravallion, 2004, for details).  The fact that the line is not a strict lower 
bound means that the curvature properties of the distribution functions start to come into play.  
For example, if the international poverty line is set at the mean of the national lines and these are 
everywhere below the mode of the (unimodal) distributions then the measures based on the 
international lines will again be below those based on the aggregation of national poverty 
measures.  (This follows from well-known properties of convex functions.)  However, putting 
these special cases to one side, the implications of re-calculating the urban-rural poverty profile 
for the developing world based on international poverty lines rather than national poverty lines 
are theoretically ambiguous.  46
Appendix 2: Survey data sets by country, date and welfare indicator 
Region Country 
Share of 2002  
population 
represented (%)  Survey years 
Welfare  
measure 
Ratio of  urban/ 
rural poverty lines 
(1993) 
East Asia and Pacific  94.61      1.30 
 Cambodia    1994,  2004,  Expenditure  1.23 
 China    1993,  1999,  2002  Expenditure  1.37 
 Indonesia    1993,  1999,  2002  Expenditure  1.11 
 Laos    1992,  Expenditure  1.04 
 Mongolia    2002,  Expenditure  1.16 
 Philippines    1998,  2000  Expenditure  1.46 
 Thailand    2002,  Expenditure  1.54 
 Vietnam    1992/93,  1998,  2002  Expenditure  1.24 
Europe and Central Asia  91.82      1.05 
 Albania    1996,  2002  Expenditure  1.05 
 Armenia   
1998/99, 2001, 2002, 
2003 Expenditure  1.02 
 Azerbaijan    2001,  2002,  2003  Expenditure  1.01 
 Belarus    1998,  2001,  2002  Expenditure  1.00 
 Bulgaria    1995,  2001,  2003  Expenditure  1.04 
 Estonia    2000,  2002  Expenditure  0.98 
 Georgia    1997,  1999,  2002  Expenditure  1.02 
 Hungary    1999,  2002  Expenditure  0.99 
 Kazakhstan    1996,  2002  Expenditure  1.04 
 Kyrgyz    1998,  2000,  2002  Expenditure  1.10 
 Latvia    2002,  Expenditure  1.02 
 Lithuania    1998,  2002  Expenditure  1.01 
 Macedonia    1999,  2002 Expenditure  1.05 
 Moldova    1997,  1998,  2002  Expenditure  1.06 
 Poland    1999,  2002  Expenditure  1.04 
 Romania    1998,  2002  Expenditure  1.17 
 Russia    1998,  2002  Expenditure  1.07 
 Tajikhstan    1999,  2002  Expenditure  1.06 
 Turkey    2002,  Expenditure  1.03 
 Ukraine    1996,  2003  Expenditure  1.04 
 Uzbekistan    1998,  2002  Expenditure  1.04 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 96.67      1.44 
 Argentina   
1992, 1996, 1998, 2002, 
2003, 2004  Income  1.43 
 Bolivia    1997,  1999,  2002  Income  1.40 
 Brazil   
1990, 1993, 1996, 1998, 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004  Income  1.55 
 Chile   
1990, 1994, 1996, 1998, 
2000, 2003  Income 1.43 
  Colombia    1996, 1998, 2000, 2003  Income  1.25 
  Costa Rica    1992, 1998, 2001, 2004  Income  1.36 
  Dominican Rep    1992, 2000, 2003  Expenditure  1.06 
 Ecuador    1994,  1998  Income  1.24 
  El Salvador    1995, 1998, 2000, 2002  Income  1.71   47
 Guatemala    1998,  2000,  2002  Income  1.09 
 Haiti    2001,  Income  1.43 
 Honduras    1992,  1999,  2003  Income  1.41 
 Jamaica    1990,  1996,  2000  Expenditure  0.90 
 Mexico   
1992, 1994, 1998, 2000, 
2002 Expenditure  1.44 
 Nicaragua    1993,  1998,  2001  Income  1.43 
 Panama    1996,  2002,  Income  1.43 
 Paraguay    1998,  2003  Income  1.43 
 Peru    1994,  2002  Income  1.26 
 
Trinidad & 
Tobago   1992,  Income  1.43 
  Uruguay    1992, 1998, 2001, 2003  Income  1.43 
 Venezuela    1992,  1996,  2004  Income  1.43 
Middle East and North 
Africa 69.56      1.10 
 Egypt    1995,  1999/00  Expenditure  1.09 
 Iran    1994,  1999,  Expenditure  1.13 
 Jordan    2002/03,  Expenditure  1.13 
 Morocca    1990/91,  1998/99 Expenditure 1.29 
 Tunisia    1995,  2000  Expenditure  1.18 
 Yemen    1998 Expenditure  0.99 
South Asia  98.48      1.30 
  Bangladesh    1991/92, 1995/96, 2000  Expenditure  1.29 
 India    1993/94,  2005  Expenditure  1.37 
 Nepal    1995/96,  2003/04  Expenditure  1.24 
 Pakistan   
1992/93, 1998/99, 
2001/02 Expenditure  1.13 
 Sri  Lanka    1999/00,  2002  Expenditure  1.10 
Sub-Saharan Africa  75.03      1.29 
 Benin    2003,  Expenditure  1.79 
 Botswana    1993/94,  Expenditure  1.45 
  Burkina Faso    1994, 1998, 2003  Expenditure  1.45 
 Burundi    1998,  Expenditure  1.45 
 Cameroon    1996,  2001  Expenditure  1.45 
 Cape  Verde    2001,  Expenditure  1.45 
 Cote  d'Ivoire    1998,  2002  Expenditure  1.25 
 Ethiopia    2000,  Expenditure  1.46 
 Gambia    1998,  Expenditure  1.26 
 Ghana    1991/92,  1998/99,    Expenditure  1.35 
 Kenya    1994,  1997  Expenditure  1.45 
 Lesotho    1995,    Expenditure  1.45 
 Madagascar    1997,  2001  Expenditure  1.14 
 Malawi    2004/05  Expenditure  1.45 
 Mali    1994,  2001  Expenditure  1.45 
 Mauritania    1995/96,  2000  Expenditure  1.10 
 Mozambique    1996/97,  2002/03,  Expenditure  1.67 
 Niger    1994/95,  Expenditure  1.50 
 Nigeria    1996/97,  2003  Expenditure  1.05 
 Rwanda    1997,  2000  Expenditure  1.45 
 Senegal    1994/95,  2001  Expenditure  1.63   48
  South Africa    1995, 2000  Expenditure  1.45 
 Swaziland    2000/01,  Expenditure  1.45 
 Tanzania    1991/92,  2000/01  Expenditure  1.21 
 Uganda    1992/93,  1999,  2002  Expenditure  1.10 
 Zambia    1996,  1998,  2002/03  Expenditure  1.45 
Total     94.46        1.30 
Notes: The ratio of rural to urban poverty lines by region and total is a population weighted average.  
 
 